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lower-income tenants. Such tenants, in many communities, tend to
be racial minorities that are protected classes under the FHA.
Housing code enforcement can make property management more
expensive, which can result in higher rents that may price out these
tenants.
On one hand, cities argue that housing codes must be strictly
1
enforced to ensure the safety of residents. But on the other hand,
landlords and tenants argue that to further fair housing, code
enforcement must not inadvertently discriminate against low2
income properties that are often home to protected classes.
Absent any intentional discrimination in housing code
enforcement, the key to any fair housing suit in the context of this
article is disparate impact, which finds discrimination where a
3
policy has a disproportionate adverse effect on a protected class.
The doctrine of disparate impact is in an unsettled state
4
because the FHA statute does not expressly mention it, even
5
though every federal circuit recognizes it. But the circuits are split
1. Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 2d 987, 993, 999 (D. Minn.
2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th
Cir. 2010) (noting that even the plaintiffs did not dispute that “enforcement of the
housing code is necessary to achieving [the] objectives” of the City to “keep[] the
City clean, and housing habitable, and mak[e] . . . [its] neighborhoods the safest
and most livable of any in Minnesota.”); see also Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 5,
Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011)(No. 10-1032), available at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Petitioners-Reply10-1032-Magner.pdf (including the City of St. Paul’s argument that landlords
should not be allowed to use the FHA to avoid compliance with housing codes and
“rent dilapidated and unsafe housing to minorities”).
2. Steinhauser, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 995, 997 (noting that the plaintiffs claimed
that “enforcement of the housing code, which is stricter than the . . . [federal
Housing Quality Standards], has a disparate impact on African-Americans because
compliance with the housing code increases the costs of low-income housing and
African-Americans make up a disproportionate percentage of low-income
tenants”).
3. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 10:6
(2011), available at WL, Housing Discrimination Law and Litigation § 10:6 (“The
key questions in [a disparate impact] case will then be whether the impact of the
defendant’s policy or practice is significantly greater on a class of persons
protected by the Fair Housing Act than it is on nonprotected class members, and if
so, whether the defendant has provided a sufficiently strong justification for using
this policy or practice to overcome the prima facie case that the plaintiff’s showing
of disparate impact has created.”).
4. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM & SARA K. PRATT, NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE,
DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE FAIR HOUSING ACT: A PROPOSED APPROACH 9 (2009),
available at http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/DISPARATE
%20IMPACT%20ANALYSIS%20FINAL.pdf.
5. Id. at 3.
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as to the applicable standard for disparate impact claims.
Adding to the confusion, the U.S. Supreme Court has largely
7
stayed out of the matter. In the last twenty-five years, the Supreme
Court has missed three opportunities to conclusively decide
whether the FHA includes a disparate impact standard and to
define a sensible test. In 1988, the Court reserved judgment on the
disparate impact issue in Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch,
8
NAACP. And in 2003, the Court nearly had an opportunity in City
9
of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation, but the
disparate impact claim was dropped after certiorari was granted.
In November 2011, the Court decided to take up the issue by
10
granting certiorari for the City of St. Paul, Minnesota from an
11
The two questions
Eighth Circuit case, Gallagher v. Magner.
presented in the petition for certiorari were: (1) whether disparate
impact claims are cognizable under the FHA; and (2) if such claims
12
But in February
are cognizable, how they should be analyzed.
2012, the City of St. Paul withdrew its petition, resulting in yet
another missed opportunity for the Court to decide on the
13
As a
disparate impact issue in housing discrimination law.
consequence, the question of whether the Supreme Court will
recognize disparate impact claims under the FHA will continue to
go unanswered and the circuit split on the application of a
disparate impact standard will continue for the foreseeable future.
The first part of this article will trace the background of
14
disparate impact and the FHA. The second part will provide an
6. Brief for Int’l Municipal Lawyers Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 2, Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011) (No. 10-1032), available
at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Brief-05-19-11154207.pdf.
7. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 4.
8. 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
9. 538 U.S. 188 (2003).
10. Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306
(2012).
11. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied
reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), and
cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012).
12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548
(2011) (No. 10-1032), available at http://www.justalandlord.com/wp-content
/uploads/2011/02/1102-Petition-for-Writ-of-Certiori.pdf, dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306
(2012).
13. See No. 10-1032, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-1032.htm
(last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
14. See infra Part I.
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15

overview of Gallagher. The third part of this article will discuss the
16
The
current problems with disparate impact under the FHA.
fourth part will recommend how the Court, if ever given the
chance, should rule by providing legal and policy reasons for
recognition of disparate impact under the FHA, as well as some
17
The article will conclude with a
suggested considerations.
recommendation that disparate impact under the FHA should be
defined similarly to disparate impact in the employment
18
discrimination context as established in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
I.

DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE FHA

A. History of the FHA
1.

Need for the FHA

Prior to the FHA, segregated housing in the United States
persisted because of racially restrictive zoning regulations and
covenants, segregated public housing projects, realtors steering
minorities away from white neighborhoods, and voluntary
19
20
segregation. White flight only made matters worse.
Senator Walter Mondale, who introduced the original FHA
bill, argued that it was “necessary to eliminate discriminatory
practices of property owners, real estate brokers, builders, and
21
Mondale intended the FHA to replace the
home financers.”
22
ghettos ‘“by truly integrated and balanced living patterns.”’

15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part V.
19. Rebecca Tracy Rotem, Note, Using Disparate Impact Analysis in Fair Housing
Act Claims: Landlord Withdrawal From the Section 8 Voucher Program, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1971, 1975 (2010).
20. White Flight, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_flight (last
visited Apr. 1, 2012).
21. Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 423 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing
114 CONG. REC. S2272–84 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1968)).
22. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting 114
CONG. REC. 3422 (1968)).
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Building Support for the FHA

Ultimately, the FHA was passed as Title VIII of the Civil Rights
23
Act of 1968. But two years prior to its passage, the issue of fair
24
It was a divisive issue,
housing languished in Congress.
“prompt[ing] the most vicious mail [President Lyndon B. Johnson]
25
received on any subject.”
The lobbying efforts of two men turned the tide, however.
The first was Senator Edward Brooke, the first African-American
26
Senator to be elected by popular vote. Partnering with Senator
Edward Kennedy, Senator Brooke spoke of his personal experience
returning from World War II and being denied housing for his
27
Incidentally, a similar problem was
family due to his race.
reoccurring with the Vietnam War.
In particular, wartime
casualties fell disproportionately on racial minorities and the
families of fallen soldiers of color were being denied housing due
28
to their race.
The second individual was Martin Luther King, Jr., who
became closely associated with fair housing legislation because he
organized the Chicago open housing marches, which occurred in
29
1966. As of March 1968, according to President Johnson’s special
assistant for domestic affairs, there was “no hope” of passage of the
30
But President Johnson used King’s
FHA in the House.
assassination as an opportunity to finally push the fair housing bill
23. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 801–19, 82 Stat. 73, 81–-89
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§3601–19 (2006)).
24. History of Fair Housing, HUD.GOV, http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD
?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/aboutfheo/history (last visited
Apr. 1, 2012).
25. Joseph Califano, Jr., A Complex Partnership / MLK and LBJ Needed Each
Other—and They Knew It, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan. 15, 2008. Public resentment
toward fair housing efforts was also felt by Martin Luther King, Jr., who remarked
that when he advocated for fair housing in Chicago he had “never seen such
hate—not in Mississippi or Alabama—as I see here in Chicago.” Id.
26. Edward Brooke, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_Brooke
(last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
27. History of Fair Housing, supra note 24. Senator Brooke additionally noted
that his problem was not unique—African-Americans could not move to better
neighborhoods because they were “surrounded by a pattern of discrimination
based on individual prejudice, often institutionalized by business and industry,
and Government practices.” 114 CONG. REC. 2526 (1968).
28. History of Fair Housing, supra note 24.
29. Monroe H. Little, Jr., More Than a Dreamer: Remembering Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., 41 IND. L. REV. 523, 534 (2008) (describing the effect of King’s marches
on the passage of the fair housing bill).
30. Califano, supra note 25.
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31

through Congress, as a “last tribute to King.” Just seven days after
32
King’s assassination on April 4, 1968, the FHA was quickly passed
33
without debate.
3.

FHA Today

The FHA today makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any
person in the . . . sale or rental of a dwelling . . . because of race,
34
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” Protection
from discrimination is also extended to the handicapped in a few
35
instances, such as in the context of advertisements or denials of
36
the availability of a rental dwelling. There is no express language
in the FHA requiring a showing of intent, in part because Congress
thought doing so would make it too difficult to show
37
discrimination. There is also no express language in the statute
authorizing discrimination claims based on showings of disparate
38
Such ambiguity has opened the door for judicial
impact.
interpretation.
B. The Roots of Disparate Impact
1.

The Court’s First Recognition of Disparate Impact

The concept of disparate impact comes from employment
discrimination law. In 1971, the landmark Supreme Court opinion
39
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. interpreted Title VII of the 1964 Civil

31. Id.
32. Matthew Jordan Cochran, Fairness in Disparity: Challenging the Application of
Disparate Impact Theory in Fair Housing Claims Against Insurers, 21 GEO. MASON U.
CIV. RTS. L.J. 159, 161 (2011).
33. History of Fair Housing, supra note 24.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006).
35. Id. § 3604(c) (prohibiting, for example, rental ads that exclude applicants
based on a handicap).
36. Id. § 3604(d) (prohibiting, for example, a landlord from expressing the
unavailability of a rental dwelling to a handicapped person when it is in fact
available).
37. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 11–12 (explaining that Congress
debated an amendment from Senator Baker that would have found liability under
the FHA where intentional discrimination occurred, but that this amendment was
defeated due to the recognition of difficulties in producing proof of intent, which
would have raised the likelihood of chances for discrimination).
38. Id. at 9 (“The text of the FHA’s substantive provisions (§§ 3604–3606 and
3617) does not explicitly state whether impact claims are or are not cognizable.”).
39. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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Rights Act to include a discriminatory effect standard.
In Griggs, a group of African-American employees in North
Carolina brought suit against their employer, Duke Power
Company, claiming that their employment practices violated the
42
Civil Rights Act.
Prior to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Duke had a policy of
relegating African-American employees to a single department,
“Labor,” where the highest-paying jobs paid less than the lowest43
paying jobs in any of the other “white” departments. But after the
Civil Rights Act passed, Duke changed its race-based employment
assignments to a policy of requiring either a high school diploma
or passing a standardized general intelligence test to either be
employed in, or transferred to, certain jobs, primarily ones with
44
higher wages.
Plaintiffs argued that degree and testing requirements
disproportionately affected African-Americans because they were
less likely than whites to have diplomas or pass the intelligence test.
In 1960 in North Carolina, thirty-four percent of white males
completed high school, compared to only twelve percent of
45
Further, fifty-eight percent of whites
African-American males.
passed Duke’s standardized intelligence tests, compared to only six
46
percent of African-Americans.
Plaintiffs also argued that degree and testing requirements did
not relate to job performance because the percentage of white
employees promoted without high school diplomas was nearly the
same as the percentage of non-graduates in the entire white work
47
force. In other words, high school graduates were no more likely
than non-graduates to be promoted.
Duke, on the other hand, argued that they lacked intent to
40. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241 (current
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006)).
41. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431–32 (“If an employment practice which operates to
exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited. . . . Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation.”).
42. Id. at 424.
43. Id. at 427.
44. Id. at 427–28.
45. Id. at 431 n.6 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
CENSUS OF POPULATION:1960 VOLUME I CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION PART
35 35-167 tbl.47 (1963)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 431–32 n.7.
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discriminate against African-American employees,
and that
section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act provided for a right to
49
condition promotions or transfers on passing certain tests.
The Court in Griggs sided with plaintiffs, holding that
“Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
50
employment practices, not simply the motivation.” Accordingly,
Duke’s intention for implementing testing requirements was not a
dispositive factor for proving or disproving employment
discrimination. Instead, what mattered was the impact caused by
the testing requirements.
The Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to prohibit
testing or measuring procedures, as long as they are a “reasonable
measure of job performance” and “measure the person for the job
51
Since the diploma and
and not the person in the abstract.”
testing requirements were not “significantly related to successful
job performance” and disqualified African-Americans at a
substantially higher rate than white applicants, Duke’s policy was
held to be discriminatory in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
52
Act.
2. Codification of Disparate Impact in Employment Discrimination
Law
The burden of proof in Title VII disparate impact cases was
53
discussed by the Court in 1989 in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio
54
and codified in an amendment to the Civil Rights Act in 1991.
Under the current statute, an unlawful employment practice based
on disparate impact may be established in only one of two ways: (1)
the complainant demonstrates that an employment practice causes
48. Id. at 432.
49. Id. at 433 (referring to Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §
703(h), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006)),
which allowed the use of tests, as long as they did not discriminate based on race).
50. Id. at 432.
51. Id. at 436.
52. Id. at 424.
53. 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (holding that defendant employer the has
burden of production of showing business justification for an employment
practice, while the burden of persuasion remains with the disparate-impact
plaintiff).
54. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(a), 105 Stat. 1071,
1074–1077 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006)). The stated
purpose of the amendment was “to clarify provisions regarding disparate impact
actions.” Id.
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a disparate impact and the employer fails to show that its practice is
55
job-related and consistent with business necessity; or (2) if the
employer refused to adopt an alternative employment practice that
complainant demonstrated (in accordance with pre-Wards Cove
56
57
law) is less discriminatory.
C. Disparate Impact Evolution in Housing Discrimination Law
1. The Supreme Court’s First FHA Decision: Trafficante v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co.
Four years after the enactment of the FHA, and just one year
after Griggs, the Supreme Court in 1972 issued its first FHA
58
The plaintiffs, who were tenants at an
decision in Trafficante.
apartment complex, claimed that their landlord discriminated
59
against non-white rental applicants. Plaintiffs asserted that they
had: (1) “lost the social benefits of living in an integrated
community;” (2) “missed business and professional advantages”
from not living with members of minority groups; and (3) “suffered
embarrassment and economic damage in social, business, and
professional activities from being ‘stigmatized’ as residents of a
60
‘white ghetto.’” Further, plaintiffs argued that they had standing
to bring an FHA claim because they fell under the FHA’s definition
of “aggrieved persons,” which includes any person who either
claims to be injured, or will be injured, by a discriminatory housing
61
practice.
Even though plaintiffs were not directly discriminated
against by their landlord based on race, the Court found that they

55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
56. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (overturning the standard for showing alternative
practices set by Wards Cove by stating such demonstrations “shall be in accordance
with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989,” which was the day before Wards Cove was
decided).
57. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d
1112, 1118 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[E]ven after such a showing [of business necessity],
the plaintiff may still overcome a proffered business necessity defense by
demonstrating that there exist alternative policies with lesser discriminatory effects
that would be comparably as effective at serving the employer’s identified business
needs.” (emphasis added)).
58. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
59. Id. at 206–08.
60. Id. at 208.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) (2006).
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62

had standing. The Court noted that the FHA’s language is “broad
63
64
and inclusive” and should be given “generous construction.”
The Court justified a broad interpretation for standing by
reasoning that barriers must be removed to private suits under the
FHA because private suits are the best enforcement mechanism—
particularly when considering that the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) does not have enforcement powers,
and the Attorney General has a small staff for fair housing
65
litigation.
2. The Initial Circuit Court Decision Regarding Disparate Impact
Under the FHA: United States v. City of Black Jack
Following Griggs (Title VII allows for showings of
66
discriminatory effect) and Trafficante (the FHA should be broadly
67
interpreted), the Eighth Circuit became the first federal appellate
68
In
court to find an FHA violation based on disparate impact.
United States v. City of Black Jack, a municipal zoning ordinance that
prohibited construction of any new multifamily dwellings was
challenged on the grounds that it denied persons housing on the
69
basis of race in violation of the FHA. At the time, Black Jack,
Missouri was “virtually all white,” with a black population of
70
Neighboring St. Louis, by
between one and two percent.
comparison, was about forty percent black, with a pupil population
71
of approximately sixty-five percent in the city’s school district.
Furthermore, about forty percent of black families in the area,
compared to fourteen percent of white families, were living in
72
overcrowded housing.
Relying on Griggs for the proposition that Congress intended
Title VII to remove “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 210–11.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209.
SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 3.
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1181 (8th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1183.
Id.
Id.
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on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification[s],” the
Eighth Circuit in Black Jack concluded that “such barriers must also
74
give way in the field of housing.” The court went on to declare
that a prima facie case of racial discrimination may be proven with
no more than a defendant’s conduct “actually or predictably
result[ing] in racial discrimination; in other words, that it has a
discriminatory effect . . . . Effect, and not motivation, is the
75
touchstone . . . .”
Under this standard, the Eighth Circuit held that the
municipal zoning ordinance had a discriminatory effect because
prohibiting construction of affordable multifamily dwellings would
“contribute to the perpetuation of segregation in a community
76
Since discriminatory
which was [ninety-nine] percent white.”
effect had been shown, the Eighth Circuit shifted the burden to the
municipal defendant “to demonstrate that its conduct was
77
necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.”
Because Black Jack could not show a compelling governmental
interest, the Eighth Circuit held that the ordinance violated the
78
FHA.
3.

Development of Disparate Impact Since Black Jack

In the years since Black Jack, a strong consensus has emerged
among the circuit courts that the FHA includes a disparate impact
79
Today, every circuit uses the disparate impact
standard.
80
But, due to a lack of guidance from the Supreme
standard.
73. Id. at 1184 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1184–85.
76. Id. at 1186.
77. Id. at 1185 & n.4 (stating that this rule was drawn from “cases involving
equal protection challenges”).
78. Id. at 1188.
79. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 3.
80. See, e.g., 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 444
F.3d 673, 679 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49
(1st Cir. 2000); Pfaff v. HUD, 88 F.3d 739, 745–46 (9th Cir. 1996); Mountain Side
Mobile Estates P’ship v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 56 F.3d 1243, 1250–51 (10th
Cir. 1995); Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994);
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934–35 (2d
Cir. 1988), aff’d in part per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467,
482–84 (9th Cir. 1988); Hanson v. Veterans Admin., 800 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5th Cir.
1986); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574–75 (6th Cir. 1986); Betsey v.
Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 986 (4th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Town of
Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564
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Court, the circuit courts have “developed substantively different
81
In fact,
standards” for judging FHA disparate impact claims.
82
three different standards have emerged among the circuits: a
83
84
“balance-of-factors test,” a “burden-shifting analysis,” and a
85
“hybrid test.”
Disparate impact under the FHA has also been adopted by
HUD. In a 1993 administrative decision, for example, the HUD
Secretary found that a “disparate impact, if proven, would establish
86
a violation of the Act.” Furthermore, HUD’s “Complaint Intake,
Investigation, and Conciliation Handbook” recognizes that
87
disparate impact may be used to show a violation of the FHA.
F.2d 126, 146–48 (3d Cir. 1977); Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977); Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184–85 (8th
Cir. 1974).
81. Brief for Int’l Municipal Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 6, at 2.
82. Id. at 2–4.
83. The “balance-of-factors test” is used in the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits. Id. at 3. The following factors are considered: “(1) the strength of
plaintiffs’ showing of discriminatory impact; (2) a quantum of evidence of
discriminatory intent; (3) the defendant’s interest in the challenged conduct; and
(4) whether the plaintiff seeks affirmative relief or an injunction to restrain
defendants from interfering with property owners who wish to provide housing.”
Id. (citing Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283,
1290 (7th Cir. 1977)).
84. The “burden-shifting analysis” is used in the Third, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits. Id. The analysis in the Third Circuit requires: “(1) plaintiff must show
disparate impact; (2) defendant must establish justification for the action; and (3)
defendant must prove no reasonable alternative means was available.” Id. (citing
Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977)). The analysis in
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits is the same for the first and second prongs, but the
burden for the third prong shifts to the plaintiff to show that a viable alternative
means was available. Id. at 3–4 (citing Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148).
85. The “hybrid test” is used in the First and Second Circuits. Id. at 4. The
“hybrid test” requires that “(1) plaintiff must present a prima facie case of disparate
impact; (2) defendant must ‘prove that its actions furthered . . . a legitimate, bona
fide governmental interest and that no alternative would serve that interest with
less discriminatory effect’; (3) the court considers whether any evidence of
discriminatory intent was presented; and (4) the court considers whether the
plaintiff seeks affirmative relief or an injunction to restrain defendants from
interfering with property owners who wish to provide housing.” Id. (citing
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (2d Cir.
1988), aff’d in part per curiam Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP,
488 U.S. 15 (1988)).
86. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Mountain Side Mobile Estates P’ship, Fair
Housing-Fair Lending Rep. (P-H) ¶ 25,053 (July 19, 1993), available at 1993 WL
307069, at *5.
87. HUD, FAIR HOUSING AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY HANDBOOK: TITLE VIII
COMPLAINT INTAKE, INVESTIGATION, AND CONCILIATION HANDBOOK (8024.01), Part 35-A-1, at 3-25 (1995), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips
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Although there is consensus among the circuit courts and
HUD that a violation of the FHA can be shown with disparate
88
impact, the Supreme Court has remained out of the debate. The
Court has held that a violation of the FHA can be found when
89
discriminatory intent is shown. But the Court has never held that
an FHA violation can be found with a showing of disparate
90
impact.
II. GALLAGHER V. MAGNER
The Gallagher case provided a great opportunity for the Court
to settle the circuit split on how disparate impact is applied, if at all,
under the FHA. Even though the petitioner, the City of St. Paul,
requested dismissal from the Court, the case presents a real-world
lens into how disparate impact has been used and suggests some
limits. Therefore, the Gallagher case is used below to discuss
disparate impact under the FHA and why the Court should
recognize it someday.
/handbooks/fheh/80241/80241c3-1FHEH.pdf (stating that HUD’s jurisdiction
over a complaint requires showing a violation of the FHA either by discriminatory
motive or discriminatory effect); id. Part 2-4-A, at 2-27 to 2-28, available at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/adm/hudclips/handbooks/fheh/80241/80241c2FH
EH.pdf (“[A] respondent may be held liable for violating the Fair Housing Act
even if his action against the complainant was not even partly motivated by illegal
considerations. . . . These cases are sometimes called ‘discriminatory impact’ or
‘discriminatory effect’ cases, because their principal focus is on the impact or
effect of the respondent’s policy rather than on his intent.”).
88. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 4.
89. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 (1977). The Court stated that “[p]roof of racially discriminatory intent or
purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. The
Court used as precedent showings of violations under the Equal Protection Clause
because no precedent for violations of the FHA existed at the time and the Court
thought such precedent was an appropriate analogy for two reasons: first, the FHA
similarly prohibited discrimination; and second, the Court had previously applied
this rule in discrimination cases involving schools, election districting, and jury
selection. See id. For such showings of “discriminatory intent,” the Court
articulated a four-factor test: “(1) the racial impact of the decision; (2) the
historical background of the decision, particularly where it reveals a series of
official actions taken for invidious purposes; (3) the specific sequence of events
leading up to the challenged decision—including departures from the normal
procedural sequence; and (4) the legislative or administrative history—especially
where there are contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking
body, or minutes of its meetings.” Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found. v. City of
Cuyahoga Falls, 263 F.3d 627, 635 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Arlington Heights, 429
U.S. at 266-68), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 538 U.S. 188 (2003).
90. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 4.
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A. Background Facts
In 2003, the City of St. Paul established the Department of
Neighborhood Housing and Property Improvement (DNHPI) to
91
administer and enforce its housing code.
The mission of the
DNHPI was to “keep the city clean, keep its housing habitable, and
make [its] neighborhoods the safest and most livable [of] anywhere
92
in Minnesota.” The director of the DNHPI sought to fulfill the
mission by conducting “proactive sweeps,” as requested by City
93
and by responding to neighborhood
District Councils,
94
complaints. The DNHPI director drafted procedural guidelines,
but since “universal application” was impossible, housing inspectors
95
had discretion in application of their rules.
Rental property owners brought suit against the City of St. Paul
96
challenging the enforcement of its housing code. These owners
rented properties to low-income households, which primarily
consisted of persons of protected classes (about sixty to seventy
97
percent of their tenant base was African-American).
B. U.S. District Court —Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp.
2d 987 (2008)
In U.S. District Court, the owners brought a number of
claims against the City: (1) disparate impact and disparate
treatment claims under the FHA; (2) an equal protection claim;
and (3) a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
98
The district court ultimately granted summary
Act claim.

91. Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 2d 987, 992 (D. Minn. 2008),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir.
2010), reh’g en banc denied reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted,
132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), and cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012).
92. Id. at 993.
93. The city of St. Paul has seventeen district councils responsible for
“planning and advising on the physical, economic, and social development of their
areas; identifying needs; initiating community programs; recruiting volunteers;
and sponsoring community events.” District Councils, SAINTPAULMINNESOTA,
http://www.stpaul.gov/index.aspx?NID=1859 (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
94. Steinhauser, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 993.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 991–92.
97. Id. at 995.
98. Id. at 992. Additional claims were brought by the owners, but the court
found they either were related to the other claims or did not warrant much
discussion due to unfounded assertions. Id.
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99

judgment for the City of St. Paul on all claims, but this article will
focus only on the disparate impact claim.
The owners argued that the City took a “heavy enforcement”
and “code to the max” approach that increased their business costs,
which reduced the supply of “affordable housing” and thus had a
100
disparate impact on racial minorities in violation of the FHA.
They cited a finding that the City’s housing code was more strict
than the federal Housing Quality Standards (HQS) laid out in 24
101
To support their claim of disparate
C.F.R. § 982.401 (2010).
impact, the owners provided evidence that a shortage of affordable
housing existed in the City and that there was an increase in
foreclosed buildings in the City that were disproportionately renter102
The owners conceded that the DNHPI’s objectives
occupied.
were “legitimate and non-discriminatory” and that enforcement was
manifestly related and “necessary” to achieving such objectives, but
argued that the HQS was a viable alternative to the City’s housing
103
code.
Conversely, the City argued that the owners had not
presented a legitimate claim under the Eighth Circuit’s disparate
104
Specifically, the City claimed that the owners
impact standard.
had not shown a prima facie case because their claims of less
affordable housing and more vacant homes could not be traced to
105
Further, the City argued that
enforcement of the housing code.
99. Id. at 1020–21.
100. Id. at 995–96.
101. Id. at 997 n.6. The owners cited a finding from the City’s fire department
that the municipal housing code was stricter than the HQS on eighty-two percent
of items compared. Id.
102. Id. at 998.
103. Id. at 999.
104. Id. at 997. The Eighth Circuit standard for determining disparate impact
involves three steps that shift the burden between plaintiff and defendant. First,
the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the objected-to action results in, or can be
predicted to result in, a disparate impact upon protected classes compared to a
relevant population.” Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 417
F.3d 898, 902 (8th Cir. 2005). Second, if the plaintiff can show a disparate impact,
then the defendant “must demonstrate that the proposed action has a ‘manifest
relationship’ to . . . legitimate, non-discriminatory policy objectives and ‘is
justifiable on the ground it is necessary to’ the attainment of these objectives.” Id.
(quoting Oti Kaga, Inc. v. S.D. Hous. Dev. Auth., 342 F.3d 871, 883 (8th Cir.
2003)). Third, if the defendant can show a necessary means to a legitimate policy
objective, then plaintiff must “show that a viable alternative means is available to
achieve those legitimate policy objectives without discriminatory effects.” Id. at
903.
105. Steinhauser, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 998.
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code enforcement was related to legitimate, non-discriminatory
106
policy objectives of providing clean, safe, and livable housing.
The court granted summary judgment for the City, holding
that the owners failed to establish a disparate impact claim under
107
First, the owners failed to offer
the FHA for two reasons.
evidence of “what rents are under the City's housing code, what
rents would be under the HQS, and the percentages of AfricanAmericans and non-African-Americans who could not afford to
rent in the City because the City enforced its housing code rather
108
than the HQS.” Second, the owners failed to show that the City’s
code enforcement “caused or contributed” to the affordable
housing shortage or that it caused increased vacancies or
109
Rather, the owners’ showings were countered with
foreclosures.
evidence that insufficient federal funding contributed to the
affordable housing shortage and that foreclosures (resulting in
vacancies) were caused by predatory lending practices, unforeseen
110
life events, and increasing interest rates.
The court found that even if the owners had shown a prima
facie case, they could still not prevail on their disparate impact
111
The
claim because their suggested alternative was not viable.
HQS, as a suggested alternative to the City’s housing code, was not
viable because it did not regulate exterior conditions (e.g.,
sanitation, extermination, and lighting), which “affect the safety
and cleanliness” of the City. And no evidence was shown that
adopting the HQS would result in greater availability of low-income
112
For these reasons, the HQS
housing or rent decreases.
alternative would not allow the City to achieve its policy objectives
113
without discriminatory effects.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 998–99.
Id. at 992.
Id. at 997–98.
Id. at 998.
Id.
Id. at 999.
Id.
Id.
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1451
114

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed summary judgment
115
on the disparate impact claim, but affirmed on all other claims.
The court found that the owners had in fact presented a prima
facie case and that the issue of a viable alternative was a fact
116
question, which made summary judgment improper.
In regard to the owners’ prima facie case, the court concluded
that enough evidence was presented to withstand summary
117
The owners presented evidence supporting an
judgment.
affordable housing shortage, racial minorities disproportionately
constituting low-income households, increased costs for landlords
of low-income tenants resulting from the City’s code enforcement,
and decreased affordable housing resulting from the City’s code
118
The court then inferred from this evidence that
enforcement.
the City’s code enforcement burdened the owners, which
burdened the tenants, and decreased an already short supply of
affordable housing, which disproportionately affected racial
minorities since they were more likely to be low-income and
119
The court said that
dependent on low-income housing.
“[t]hough there is not a single document that connects the dots of
[the owners’] disparate impact claim, it is enough that each
120
analytic step is reasonable and supported by evidence.”
Further, the appellate court determined that the district court
was mistaken in requiring a “before-and-after cost-of-rent
comparison” because it is one way to show disparate impact, but it
121
is “not the only way.”
In regard to the owners’ presentation of a viable alternative to
the City’s code enforcement, the court concluded that there was a
genuine dispute of fact and thus the issue was improperly disposed

114. It is unclear why on appeal the named plaintiff changed from Steinhauser
to Gallagher, but it appears that Steinhauser was not included as a litigant on
appeal.
115. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 829 (8th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied
reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), and
cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012).
116. Id. at 837.
117. Id. at 837.
118. Id. at 834–35.
119. Id. at 835.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 837.
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122

of on summary judgment.
Ignored by the district court, the
owners suggested the City’s previous housing code enforcement
program, Problem Properties 2000, (PP2000) was a viable
123
alternative. But there was disagreement between the City and the
owners over how much reduction in impact on protected class
124
The court ruled that this was a
members PP2000 would have.
factual dispute and declined to analyze the viability of PP2000 as an
125
alternative.
D. 8th Circuit II — Gallagher v. Magner, 636 F.3d 380 (2010)
The petition for rehearing en banc and rehearing by the panel
126
Two
was denied, but a lengthy dissenting opinion was provided.
issues were suggested for analysis by the dissent. First, the basis for
127
disparate impact analysis under the FHA should be examined.
The U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on this matter and there
has been “little consideration” in the Eighth Circuit of the basis for
128
liability shown by disparate impact.
Additionally, the dissent pointed to a recent Supreme Court
decision that cast doubt on justifications for allowing disparate
129
In 2005, Smith
impact showings under the FHA based on Griggs.
v. City of Jackson held that disparate impact is cognizable under the
130
The Supreme
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
Court held that one section of the ADEA (section 4(a)(2)) allows a
disparate impact standard because the statutory language is
131
“identical” to the language of Title VII in Griggs, while it also
122. Id. at 838.
123. Id. at 837.
124. Id. at 838.
125. Id.
126. Gallagher v. Magner, 636 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2010).
127. Id. at 381 (Colloton, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 382–83.
129. Id.
130. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
131. Id. at 236–38. The statutory language interpreted in Griggs included:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 n.1 (1971). The “identical” language
of section 4(a)(2) of the ADEA (now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2006))
declared it unlawful for an employer “‘to limit, segregate, or classify his employees
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
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found that another section (section 4(a)(1)) had “key textual
132
differences” and does not include a disparate impact standard.
The problem, however, is that the statutory language in the ADEA
held to not include disparate impact is similar to the language used
133
in the FHA.
Third, the dissent stated that if disparate impact analysis is
based on the purpose of the FHA, then it is worth considering
whether that purpose extends to make a city liable for aggressive
134
The circuit court had determined
housing code enforcement.
when application of disparate impact analysis was appropriate in
other contexts, but this was unchartered territory and so the dissent
135
wanted a rehearing to discuss this.
E. Petition for Certiorari
The City submitted a petition for writ of certiorari in response
to the Eighth Circuit’s decision to allow the owners’ case to
proceed to trial based on its finding that sufficient evidence of
136
The City argued that a circuit split
disparate impact was shown.
over disparate impact under the FHA has resulted in inconsistent
137
applications of the FHA across the country. The City, explaining
that landlords in Los Angeles can avoid maintenance requirements
by claiming the municipality is violating the FHA, while landlords
in Milwaukee cannot, argued, “[t]he FHA should not be a vehicle
to allow landlords to rent dilapidated and unsafe housing to

opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s age . . . .’” Smith, 544 U.S. at 233 (citation omitted).
132. Smith, 544 U.S. at 235–36 & n.6. The language section 4(a)(1) of the
ADEA (now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006)) that seemingly discourages
disparate impact included that it be unlawful “‘to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s age . . . .’” Smith, 544 U.S. at 248–50 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted).
133. Gallagher, 636 F.3d at 383 (Colloton, J., dissenting). The language of the
FHA, which is similar to section 4(a)(1) of the ADEA (found to not allow disparate
impact claims), provides that it is unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the
making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or
otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006).
134. Gallagher, 636 F.3d at 383-84 (Colloton, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 384.
136. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 12.
137. Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 1, at 1.
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138

minorities.”
The City requested that the Court determine whether or not
disparate impact applies under the FHA, and if it does, that a
139
The City’s petition for
uniform test for all circuits be advanced.
140
certiorari was granted in November 2011, but the City requested
141
Bowing to “pressure
dismissal of its petition in February 2012.
from civil rights and housing advocates nationwide,” St. Paul Mayor
142
Mayor Coleman
Chris Coleman revoked the City’s petition.
feared an increasingly conservative and pro-business Court would
likely have delivered “Pyrrhic victory” for the City that would
143
Even the
weaken disparate impact in civil rights enforcement.
FHA’s principal sponsor, Walter Mondale, was worried the Court
would find disparate impact under the FHA unconstitutional,
144
which “would largely de-fang the Fair Housing Act."
Whatever the reasons, the Gallagher plaintiffs will still have
their day in court—it will just be in federal district court rather
145
The unfortunate reality of
than in front of the Supreme Court.
the missed opportunity for the Court in Gallagher is that the status
of disparate impact claims under the FHA and the standards that
might apply to such claims remain unsettled at the national level.
Gallagher demonstrated the need for resolution of the FHA
disparate impact problem in this country. Below is a discussion of
this problem, followed by recommendations for the Court when
they are next faced with deciding whether FHA violations can be
shown with disparate impact.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT STATE OF DISPARATE IMPACT
Despite the seemingly strong consensus that a disparate impact
standard exists under the FHA, the federal circuit courts disagree

138. Id. at 5.
139. Id. at 10–11.
140. Magner v. Gallagher, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306
(2012).
COURT
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES,
141. No.
10-1032,
SUPREME
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/10-1032.htm
(last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
142. Kevin Diaz, St. Paul Yanks Housing Fight from High Court, STAR TRIB. (Feb.
10, 2012), http://www.startribune.com/politics/national/139138084.html.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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146

on its application. Case in point: the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and
147
Tenth Circuits use a “balance-of-factors test”; while the Third,
148
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits use a “burden-shifting analysis”; and
149
Due to this
the First and Second Circuits use a “hybrid test.”
circuit split, Gallagher may have been decided differently had it
occurred in another circuit, even though the FHA is a federal
statute that is supposed to be applied nationally. This lack of a
uniform standard has caused a number of problems.
A. Different Standards, Different Outcomes: Tenth Circuit
Under Tenth Circuit precedent, the City of St. Paul may not
have had its summary judgment motion reversed as it had in the
150
In Reinhart v. Lincoln County, the Tenth Circuit
Eighth Circuit.
held that plaintiffs had not established a prima facie case of
disparate impact because it was insufficient “to show that (1) a
regulation would increase housing costs and (2) members of a
151
protected group tend to be less wealthy than others.” The City of
St. Paul cited Reinhart in arguing that the owners could not just
show that enforcement of the “Housing Code increases the cost of
low-income housing and that African-Americans tend to have lower
152
The Eighth Circuit did not buy the City’s argument
incomes.”
and ultimately rejected Reinhart, reasoning that “the existence of a
significant statistical disparity, even one resulting from economic
153
inequality, is sufficient to create a prima facie case.” Thus, under
the Tenth Circuit’s higher standard for disparate impact showings,
the City likely would have had its summary judgment motion
affirmed.

146. Petitioners’ Reply Brief, supra note 1, at 1; see also Brief for Int’l Municipal
Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 6, at 2 (“Lacking the Court’s guidance, the Circuit
Courts have developed substantively different standards against which to judge
such FHA standards.”); supra notes 82–85.
147. See supra note 83.
148. See supra note 84.
149. See supra note 85.
150. Brief for Int’l Municipal Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 6, at 7.
151. Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty., 482 F.3d 1225, 1230 (10th Cir. 2007).
152. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 836 (8th Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied
reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), and
cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012).
153. Id. (citing Williams v. 5300 Columbia Pike Corp., 891 F. Supp. 1169, 1180
n.23 (E.D. Va. 1995)).
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B. Different Standards, Different Outcomes: Second Circuit
Similarly, under Second Circuit precedent, the City of St. Paul
may not have lost in the Eighth Circuit. In Tsombanidis v. West
Haven Fire Department, the Second Circuit concluded that the
plaintiffs had not shown a prima facie case of disparate impact
because they did not prove a quantitative or qualitative comparison
154
between a protected class and the non-protected population.
The court reasoned that although some cases may not require
statistics, “there must be some analytical mechanism to determine
155
disproportionate impact,” and that a “plaintiff has not met its
156
burden if it merely raises an inference of discriminatory impact.”
The Eighth Circuit, however, twisted the language and logic
of the Tsombanidis decision when it allowed a lower standard for a
showing of a disparate impact claim in Gallagher. First of all,
despite the Second Circuit disallowing inferences of disparate
157
impact, the Eighth Circuit allowed such inferences by concluding
that “[t]hough there is not a single document that connects the
dots of [the owners’] disparate impact claim, it is enough that each
158
analytic step is reasonable and supported by evidence.”
Essentially, the Eighth Circuit allowed an inference of
discriminatory impact, which the Second Circuit disallows.
Secondly, while the Second Circuit requires either a
quantitative or qualitative comparison between protected and nonprotected classes, the Eighth Circuit similarly held that a “statistical
comparison” is “not the only way” to show “disproportionate adverse
159
effect.” The Eighth Circuit in Gallagher, unlike the district court
in Steinhauser, did not require that the owners provide a
160
Rather,
quantitative “before-and-after cost-of-rent comparison.”
the Eighth Circuit was satisfied that enough evidence (without a
statistical comparison) was offered to withstand summary
161
judgment. Thus, the Eighth Circuit allowed a lower standard for
disparate impact because it did not require an analytical
comparison between protected and non-protected classes.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 577–78 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 576.
Id. at 575.
See id. at 575.
Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 835.
Id. at 837.
Id.
Id.
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But even if the Eighth Circuit did require a qualitative
comparison, the Gallagher owners likely would not have met the
Second Circuit’s standard. Such a standard would have required
the Gallagher owners to qualitatively show that the average
protected-class person in St. Paul had a greater “need” for
affordable housing than the average non-protected-class person in
162
The Gallagher owners presented evidence that,
the city.
compared to all renter households, a majority of renters were racial
163
minorities and that of all those on public housing waiting lists, a
164
majority of them were African-American. But the owners did not
show that racial minorities (a protected class) in St. Paul “need”
affordable housing any more than the average low-income person
(a non-protected class) in the city. Although subtle, there is a
difference between showing that the average racial minority group
has a greater “need” for affordable housing and just showing that a
majority of renters and public housing applicants are racial
minorities because there is no comparison to the racial minority
population as a whole, beyond just renters and public housing
applicants.
C. Lack of a National Standard is Unfair
Prior to revoking its petition, the City of St. Paul requested
that the Court eliminate the circuit split and “harmonize the
165
The City argued that the
circuits” to correct this unfairness.
circuit split is unfair because landlords in one circuit should not be
able to avoid municipal maintenance standards through disparate
impact claims under the FHA (as was the case in Gallagher), while
166
landlords in another circuit have to abide by them. Additionally,
the International Municipal Lawyers Association agreed with the
162. In Tsombanidis, the plaintiffs were owners of a group home for recovering
alcoholics that claimed it was the target of the city’s discriminatory application of
the fire code, which prohibited six unrelated individuals from living together
unless expensive modifications were made to the home. Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at
571–72. The court said that since plaintiffs did not provide any statistical
comparison they could have provided a qualitative comparison showing that the
average recovering alcoholic in the city had a greater need (qualitatively) for
group living than does the average non-recovering alcoholic resident. Id. at 577.
163. Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 834.
164. Id.
165. Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 1, at 5.
166. Id.; see also Brief for Int’l Municipal Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 6, at 5–6
(arguing that while the owners’ disparate impact claim was sustained in Gallagher
in the Eighth Circuit, their claim would not have survived in the Fourth Circuit).
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City and argued that “[w]ithout this [Supreme] Court’s resolution
of the Circuit Court conflict the law will remain incapable of
serving its intended purpose: establishing a singular anti167
discrimination standard equally applicable across the country.”
D. Judicial Inefficiency
The lack of a clear national standard may create judicial
inefficiencies due to confusion over the appropriate analysis to
apply to disparate impact claims. Dubious claims may proceed to
trial and legitimate claims may be dismissed on summary judgment.
Regardless of the validity of the owners’ claim in Gallagher, a clear
standard would have avoided judicial bickering over the
168
Similar situations
appropriate standard for disparate impact.
169
have played out in other circuits as well.
E. Less Safe Housing
Another problem is that in circuits with low standards for
disparate impact showings under the FHA, municipalities may be
reluctant to enforce stricter housing codes for fear that
170
If
enforcement may open them up to increased litigation.
municipalities relax enforcement of housing codes on low-incometenant properties, which are already in poor condition, then the
171
Maintaining the status
inevitable result is even less safe housing.
quo allows the preservation of lower standards in some circuits, but
establishing a national standard at some middle ground would at
least raise the standard in these circuits, which would theoretically
free cities up to enforce their housing codes against all properties
not in compliance.

167. Brief for Int’l Municipal Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 6, at 8.
168. Gallagher, 619 F.3d at 833–38.
169. See, e.g., Mount Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount
Holly, 658 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2011); Cmty. Servs. v. Wind Gap Mun. Auth., 421 F.3d
170 (3d Cir. 2005); Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729
(8th Cir. 2005).
170. Interview with James E. Wilkinson, Attorney, Legal Aid Society of
Minneapolis, in St. Paul, Minn. (July 29, 2011).
171. Id.
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IV. HOW THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD SOMEDAY RULE
If ever given the opportunity, the Supreme Court should
recognize disparate impact as a valid legal theory for showing
violations of the FHA. Although the Eighth Circuit’s decision in
Gallagher seems to hamstring cities, disparate impact is important to
fair housing and should be recognized by the Court for a number
of legal and policy reasons. Eliminating disparate impact entirely
would be one solution to the problem of inconsistent application.
But it would be a drastic move with thin legal support and would be
ignorant of numerous valid policy considerations.
A. Legal Support for Disparate Impact under the FHA
1.

Similar Statutory Language between FHA and Title VII

There is no express mention in the statutory language of the
FHA that allows any discriminatory “impact” or “effect” to show a
172
One may argue that, in the forty-year history of the
violation.
FHA, Congress could have included a disparate impact standard in
the language of the statute if it ever really intended or desired.
However, Title VII similarly lacked such statutory
173
language, but the Court in Griggs still found a disparate impact
174
It is only logical that when statutes share similar
standard.
language and purposes, and were enacted in close proximity to
each other, “‘it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended
175
Both the
that text to have the same meaning in both statutes.’”
FHA and Title VII were enacted for the broad purpose of reducing
176
Further,
discrimination and were enacted only four years apart.
the two statutes share strikingly similar language:

172. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 9.
173. Id.
174. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
175. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 8 (quoting Smith v. City of Jackson,
544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005)).
176. Title VII was passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title VIII,
or the FHA, was passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
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Title VII
Employment
Discrimination
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for
an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against
any
individual
with
respect
to
his
compensation,
terms,
conditions, or privileges
of employment, because
of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or
classify his employees or
applicants
for
employment in any way
which would deprive or
tend to deprive any
individual
of
employment
opportunities
or
otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee,
because
of
such
individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national
origin.

[Vol. 38:4

Title VIII
Fair Housing Act
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–
(b)
[I]t shall be unlawful—
(a) To refuse to sell or
rent after the making
of a bona fide offer, or
to refuse to negotiate
for the sale or rental of,
or otherwise make
unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person
because of race, color,
religion, sex, familial
status,
or
national
origin.
(b) To discriminate
against any person in
the terms, conditions,
or privileges of sale or
rental of a dwelling, or
in the provision of
services or facilities in
connection therewith,
because of race, color,
religion, sex, familial
status,
or
national
origin.

Given the similarities in language, purpose, and time of
enactment, the Court allowing disparate impact for one statute but
not for the other would be at odds with the judicial principle of
consistency.
Allowing disparate impact for employment
discrimination cases, but not for housing discrimination cases,
would be tantamount to the Court making a policy determination
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that the rights of protected classes are more important in
employment contexts than in housing contexts. Gallagher could
have been the Griggs for housing discrimination law and the Court
should therefore have held similarly given the similarities between
the two statutes.
2.

Disparate Impact Is Not Inconsistent with the FHA

The Court could have found in Gallagher, as it suggested in
Smith, that the employment discrimination statutory language
differs from housing discrimination statutory language so that
disparate impact is allowed in employment cases, but perhaps not
177
The principal difference is that the word
in housing cases.
“affect” is present in employment discrimination statutory
language, but no similar word is present in housing discrimination
178
law.
However, Robert Schwemm, a professor at the University of
Kentucky College of Law, argues that the Court’s decision in Smith
does not support the notion that disparate impact cannot be found
179
He points out that the Court said
in the language of the FHA.
the reason one section of the ADEA is inconsistent with an impact
standard is because it focuses on discrimination against a “‘targeted
180
individual.’” But he argues that the language of the FHA focuses
on discrimination against “any person,” which “reflects a general
concern with protecting all people, not just a particular individual,”
181
so that an impact standard is not inconsistent with the FHA.
Since no conflict exists, an impact standard can be found under the
FHA.
3.

Congress Acquiesced to Disparate Impact

One may argue that Congress chose to codify disparate impact
182
in employment discrimination law in 1991, but, since it has not
done the same in housing discrimination law, the Court finding
otherwise would be contrary to the intent of Congress. Congress
actually had a chance to codify disparate impact under the FHA
177. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.
178. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006), with 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).
179. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 10.
180. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006) (section 4(a)(1) of the ADEA)).
181. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d)).
182. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 105(a), 106, 107(a), 105
Stat. 1071, 1074–1076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006)).
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when it passed amendments to the statute in 1988, but it decided
183
otherwise.
However, by remaining silent on the issue in 1988, Congress
acquiesced to judicial interpretations of disparate impact under the
184
FHA. Prior to passage of the amendment that year, every federal
circuit court of appeal presented with the issue had determined
185
that the FHA included an impact standard. Congress acquiesced
because it is “presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial
interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it
186
Both the House and
re-enacts a statute without change . . . .”
Senate were aware of these judicial decisions, and the House
Judiciary Committee even went so far as to embrace an impact
standard by rejecting an amendment that would have eliminated
187
Thus,
an impact standard and added an intent requirement.
Congress has shown that it implicitly accepts a disparate impact
standard; therefore, the Court’s recognition of such a standard
would not be contrary to Congress’s intent.
4. Violations of the FHA Purposely Not Limited to Showings of
“Intent”
The legislative history of the FHA demonstrates that
Congress deliberately did not limit showings of violations to
188
The FHA’s principal sponsor, Senator Walter Mondale,
“intent.”
189
spoke twice of the Act combating “effects” of discrimination.
Additionally, during congressional debate of the FHA, a floor
amendment was introduced that would have specifically included

183. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, §§ 6(a)–
(b)(2), (e), 15, 102 Stat. 1619, 1620, 1622, 1623, 1636 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 3604 (2006)).
184. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 12–13.
185. Id. at 12.
186. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978); SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note
4, at 12.
187. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 12–13 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at
89–93 (1988)).
188. Id. at 10–12.
189. Id. at 11. In explaining that the Supreme Court had prohibited explicitly
racial zoning laws, Senator Mondale explained that “[l]ocal ordinances with the
same effect . . . were still being enacted.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing 114 CONG.
REC. 2669 (1968)). When advocating for passage of the FHA, Senator Mondale
stated that it “seems only fair . . . that Congress should now pass a fair housing act
to undo the effects” of previous governmental discrimination. Id. (citing 114 CONG.
REC. 2669 (1968)) (emphasis added).
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190

an intent standard.
But the amendment was defeated because
the bill’s supporters believed it would have made “proof of
191
Thus,
discrimination difficult in all but the most blatant cases.”
Congress purposely chose to allow showings other than “intent” for
FHA violations.
5.

Every Federal Circuit Supports Disparate Impact

Despite differing interpretations for application, every circuit
192
allows for disparate impact showings. Such unanimous consensus
among the federal circuits is a resounding endorsement that the
FHA includes a disparate impact standard. The debate would be
much different if the circuits were split over whether a disparate
impact standard existed under the FHA. But that is not the case.
All circuits agree a disparate impact standard exists.
6.

Administrative Agencies Support Disparate Impact

Administrative agencies have supported an impact standard
193
HUD has embraced an
in their implementation of the FHA.
194
Also, the
impact standard in its administration of the FHA.
Department of Justice has enforcement powers under the FHA and
195
It is very telling
has urged courts to adopt an impact standard.
that the agencies that actually administer and enforce the FHA
agree that it includes a disparate impact standard.
B. Policy Reasons for Disparate Impact under the FHA
1.

Alternative Results in Discriminatory Housing Practices

Excluding disparate impact showings under the FHA would
likely result in required showings of “intent” for FHA violations,
196
which would raise the standard of proof. It is reasonable to infer
that if housing discrimination is more difficult to prosecute, then it
is likely that unintentionally discriminatory practices could grow.
190. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 11 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 5214
(1968)).
191. Id. at 11.
192. Id. at 3, 6–7; see also supra note 80.
193. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 13–14.
194. See supra notes 86–87; see also SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 13.
195. SCHWEMM & PRATT, supra note 4, at 13.
196. E-mail from Tim Thompson, President, Hous. Pres. Project, to author
(Sept. 20, 2011) (on file with author).
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The inevitable result is residential racial segregation, which leads to
concentrations of poverty, which can lead to social problems, such
as “[e]ducational and employment disadvantages, housing
dilapidation, loss of commercial facilities and businesses, crime and
197
social disorder, welfare dependency, and unwed parenthood.”
Further, residential racial segregation prevents minorities from
having the mobility to live closer to employment centers, which
may decrease their chances to gain and sustain jobs, as well as
198
increase their travel time and transportation problems.
2. FHA Is Enforced Through Private Litigation, So Court
Accessibility Requirement Should Be Low
The FHA is enforced, by design and circumstance, primarily
through private litigation, as the Supreme Court discussed in
Trafficante:
Since HUD has no enforcement powers and since the
enormity of the task of assuring fair housing makes the
role of the Attorney General in the matter minimal, the
main generating force must be private suits in which, the
Solicitor General says, the complainants act not only on
their own behalf but also “as private attorneys general in
vindicating a policy that Congress considered to be of the
highest priority.” . . . It serves an important role in this
part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 in protecting not only
those against whom a discrimination is directed but also
those whose complaint is that the manner of managing a
housing project affects “the very quality of their daily
199
lives.”
As discussed above, prohibiting a disparate impact standard
200
would raise the standard of proof for plaintiffs to get into court.
Given that private suits are the primary enforcement mechanism
for the FHA, the courtroom doors should be more open to
plaintiffs with FHA claims. Recognizing a disparate impact
standard achieves this goal by lowering the standard for showings
of FHA violations.
197. Marc Seitles, The Perpetuation of Residential Racial Segregation in America:
Historical Discrimination, Modern Forms of Exclusion, and Inclusionary Remedies, 14 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 89, 103 (1998).
198. Id. at 109.
199. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1972) (citations
omitted).
200. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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3. Recognizing Disparate Impact Under the FHA Is Not Exclusively
For Congress
201

Only Congress has constitutional authorization to make laws.
If the Court were to declare that a disparate impact standard is
included under the FHA, many may accuse the Court of
overstepping its bounds and “legislating from the bench.”
However, in our separation of powers system it is the judiciary’s
role to interpret laws passed by Congress, which may then alter
provisions of the law if it disagrees with the judiciary’s
202
As discussed above, in the field of employment
interpretation.
discrimination law, the Court interpreted Title VII to include a
disparate impact standard and Congress agreed by amending the
203
This shows that the path
statute to reflect the Court’s decision.
to legislation must go through Congress, but it need not begin with
it. So the Court would be justified in interpreting a disparate
impact standard under the FHA, just as it did in the employment
discrimination context.
4. The FHA and Title VII Should Not Have Differing Disparate
Impact Standards
Housing discrimination law should be brought in line with
employment discrimination law. It seems fair for the Court to
remain consistent with its holding in Griggs and allow disparate
impact showings for housing discrimination, just as it does in
204
Discriminating between
employment discrimination cases.
housing law and employment law seems paradoxical and the
federal circuit courts could use some guidance, in light of their
current disagreement.
Theoretically, there’s no excuse for one type of discrimination
law having a higher standard of proof than another. Just as equal
employment makes for a healthy economy, fair housing makes for a
healthy society. Voluntary residential segregation will always exist,
but every step should be taken to avoid systematic segregation in
housing.
201. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
202. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 221 (2011) (“The interpretation of existing
statutes is a judicial function with which the legislature cannot interfere; however,
the legislature has the power to alter the provisions of existing law by enacting
clarifying legislation.”).
203. See supra Part I.B.2.
204. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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C. Suggested Considerations for the Supreme Court in Recognizing an
Impact Standard
1. Defining Injury Showings Could Exclude Plaintiffs with Tenuous
Standing
In general, constitutional standing requirements dictate that
205
But in
legitimate plaintiffs must show injury to get into court.
Gallagher, the plaintiff owners’ standing was not discussed and
arguably tenuous because their implied injury was that they
received a disproportionate share of housing code violations, which
206
Are
violated the FHA because they rented to protected classes.
the real victims in that situation the owners or the tenants?
“Injured” owners had to fix code violations and raise rents, while
“injured” tenants either had to move or manage a tighter budget
due to rent increases. Owners should not be allowed to manage
properties out of compliance anyway, and their “injury” can always
be mitigated by raising rents. So perhaps the Gallagher owners
should not have been considered “injured.”
If the Court ever decides to recognize disparate impact
under the FHA, it should consider defining injury showings. It
would not be fair to say that one plaintiff (i.e., an owner) has no
standing simply because another plaintiff (i.e., a tenant) has a
more severe injury. But it would be reasonable to stipulate that
plaintiffs with standing must, at a minimum, be affected within
“close proximity” by an alleged discriminatory policy or practice.
In other words, plaintiffs that are only affected by a remote link to
an allegedly discriminatory policy or practice will be denied
standing.
2. Distinguishing Between Public Safety and Aesthetic Housing Code
Provisions
There is a difference between housing codes that promote
public health and safety and those that ensure a consistent
aesthetic. Certainly, housing codes of the former type have a
higher value to society than those of the latter. If the Court decides
205. 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 592 (2011).
206. Steinhauser v. City of St. Paul, 595 F. Supp. 2d 987, 992 (D. Minn. 2008),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir.
2010), reh’g en banc denied reh’g denied, 636 F.3d 380 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted,
132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), and cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1306 (2012).
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to recognize disparate impact under the FHA, then perhaps
enforcement of the two types of housing codes should be weighted
207
For
differently in disparate impact claims under the FHA.
example, disproportionate enforcement of a housing code that
regulates lawn care is more likely to be indicative of discrimination
than enforcement of a housing code that regulates stairway
handrails or carbon monoxide detectors.
3.

Distinguishing Between Positive and Negative Disparate Impacts

Municipal policies, such as housing codes and zoning
ordinances, can have both positive disparate impacts and negative
208
For
disparate impacts on certain segments of the population.
instance, the St. Paul housing code at issue in Gallagher was alleged
by landlords to have a negative disparate impact on their tenants.
But the neighbors could argue that the code enforcement had a
positive disparate impact on them because dangerous and unsightly
properties were forced to shape up.
If the Court were to recognize disparate impact under the
FHA, it could perhaps consider balancing the positive and negative
disparate impacts of a challenged policy or practice.
4.

Disparate Impact Analysis the Court Should Adopt

If the Court ever recognizes disparate impact under the FHA,
it should not reinvent the wheel in determining the appropriate
model for analysis of disparate impact claims. Rather, the Court
should remain consistent with the disparate impact analysis used
under Title VII for employment discrimination claims.
The disparate impact analysis in employment discrimination
law places the initial burden on the plaintiff to show a prima facie
case of an employment practice causing a disparate impact on a
209
Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie
protected class.
case, the burden of persuasion then shifts to the defendant to
justify the challenged business practice as “job related” and
210
If the defendant meets this
“consistent with business necessity.”
207.
208.
209.

Interview with James E. Wilkinson, supra note 170.
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006); 3 IVAN E. BODENSTEINER &
ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY §
6:34 (2d ed. 2011) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); 3 BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note
209, § 6:37.
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burden, the burden is then on the plaintiff to show an acceptable,
alternative, and non-discriminatory business practice was available
211
but not implemented by the defendant.
212
The “burden-shifting analysis” employed by the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits should be adopted by the Court because it neatly
parallels the disparate impact analysis in employment
discrimination law. Further, this analysis is similar to the proposed
213
disparate impact analysis by HUD, which has long studied the
issue and is an authoritative source whose judgment should
strongly be considered because it actually administers and enforces
the FHA.
V. CONCLUSION
Disparate impact under the FHA is an area of law that has
resulted in too many inconsistent applications across the country
for too long. The Supreme Court, or better yet Congress, has a
responsibility to provide clarity and Gallagher v. Magner nearly
allowed the Court to do so. When the next opportunity arises,
eliminating disparate impact in order to remove inconsistent
applications is not the answer. Yet this is the fear that drove fairhousing advocates to pressure the City to withdraw its petition.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii); 3 BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note
209, § 6:39 (“[T]he Act clarifies that the burden of demonstrating acceptable
alternative business-practice evidence rests with the plaintiffs, not the
defendants.”).
212. See supra note 84.
213. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 76 Fed. Reg. 70,921-01 (proposed Nov. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 24
C.F.R. pt. 100). The proposed rule directs:
(c) Burdens of proof in discriminatory effects cases.
(1) A complainant, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3610,
or a plaintiff, with respect to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 3613 or
3614, has the burden of proving that a challenged practice causes a
discriminatory effect.
(2) Once a complainant or plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof set forth
in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the respondent or defendant has the
burden of proving that the challenged practice has a necessary and
manifest relationship to one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory
interests of the respondent or defendant.
(3) If the respondent or defendant satisfies the burden of proof set forth
in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the complainant or plaintiff may still
prevail upon demonstrating that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory
interests supporting the challenged practice can be served by another
practice that has a less discriminatory effect.”
Id. at 70,927 (emphasis omitted).
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They would prefer the current problem of inconsistent application
214
But the
over an outright prohibition of disparate impact.
numerous legal and policy reasons discussed above suggest that the
Court would be hard pressed to not recognize a disparate impact
standard. Therefore, the Court should remain consistent with
Griggs. Just as it interpreted a disparate impact standard under
Title VII, the Court should do the same in regards to the FHA.
Similarly, the Court should recognize the “burden-shifting”
disparate impact analysis for the FHA that mirrors the disparate
impact analysis used for Title VII claims. The discrimination in
discrimination law must end—there is no reason for it.
Should the Court ever recognize a disparate impact
standard, the aforementioned suggestions ought to be considered
to afford municipalities some leeway in enforcing housing codes
without enduring excessive litigation. Fostering safe communities
is an important function that has been delegated to municipalities
and they must be afforded some protection in carrying out their
duties.
Whatever the case, disparate impact is an important legal
theory that has languished schizophrenically for too long in the
federal circuit courts. When next given the chance, the Court owes
it an identity. When that day comes, hopefully the Court
remembers its precedent and does the same thing for housing
discrimination law that it did for employment discrimination law.

214. E-mail from Tim Thompson e-mail, supra note 196; Interview with James
E. Wilkinson, supra note 170.
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